

Algorithmics of Fair Division and Social Choice (25 Nov 2024–13 Dec 2024)

List of Speakers and Talk Titles

Speaker & Affiliation	Talk Title
Georgios Amanatidis <i>University of Essex, UK</i>	Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations
Vittorio Bilò <i>University of Salento, Italy</i>	Achieving Envy-Freeness through Items Sale
Felix Brandt <i>Technical University of Munich, Germany</i>	<i>Tutorial</i> Collaborative Giving: Effective Distribution of Individual Contributions
Martin Bullinger <i>University of Oxford, UK</i>	Stability in Random Hedonic Games
Ioannis Caragiannis <i>Aarhus University, Denmark</i>	Two stories about distortion in social choice
Diptarka Chakraborty <i>National University of Singapore, Singapore</i>	Fair Rank Aggregation
Hau Chan <i>University of Nebraska-Lincoln, USA</i>	TBA
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury <i>University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA</i>	On the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies
Jiehua Chen <i>Technische Universität Wien, Austria</i>	Fairness in Assignments with Congestion-Averse Agents: Concepts, Algorithms, and Complexity
Piotr Faliszewski <i>AGH University of Science and Technology, Poland</i>	<i>Tutorial 1</i> Map of Elections: Where Are Real-Life Instances? <i>Tutorial 2</i> Algorithmic and Game-Theoretic Support for Participatory Budgeting
Jiarui Gan <i>University of Oxford, UK</i>	Envy-free policy teaching to multiple agents
Jugal Garg <i>University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA</i>	Fair allocation of indivisible chores

Speaker & Affiliation	Talk Title
Matthias Greger <i>Technical University of Munich, Germany</i>	Preference Aggregation on the Probability Simplex
Daniel Halpern <i>Harvard University, USA</i>	Aggregating Preferences with Limited Queries
Alexandros Hollender <i>University of Oxford, UK</i>	Envy-Free Cake-Cutting for Four Agents
Ayumi Igarashi <i>The University of Tokyo, Japan</i>	<i>Tutorial</i> Cake Cutting: From Continuous to Discrete Settings
Naoyuki Kamiyama <i>Kyushu University, Japan</i>	Some recent results on super-stable matchings
Yasushi Kawase <i>University of Tokyo, Japan</i>	The Random Assignment Problem Under Constraints
Alexander Lam <i>City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR</i>	Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects
Jérôme Lang <i>Université Paris Dauphine, France</i>	<i>Talk 1</i> How fair can strategy-proof fair division be? <i>Talk 2</i> Irrelevant alternatives are relevant.
Bo Li <i>Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong SAR</i>	MMS Allocation of Indivisible Chores with Subadditive Valuations and the Fair Surveillance Assignment Problem
Minming Li <i>City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR</i>	<i>Tutorial</i> Facility Location Games: Mechanisms and Variants
Xinhang Lu <i>University of New South Wales, Australia</i>	Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair Allocation of Indivisible and Mixed Goods
Ryoga Mahara <i>The University of Tokyo, Japan</i>	Proportionality up to the Least Valued Good on Average
David Manlove <i>University of Glasgow, UK</i>	Couples can be tractable: New algorithms and hardness results for the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples
Pasin Manurangsi <i>Google Research, Thailand</i>	Fair Division for Random Utilities

Speaker & Affiliation	Talk Title
Vangelis Markakis <i>Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece</i>	TBA
Jannik Peters <i>National University of Singapore, Singapore</i>	Proportional Clustering and Social Choice
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin <i>TU Eindhoven, Netherlands</i>	Monotone Randomized Apportionment
Erel Segal-Halevi <i>Ariel University, Israel</i>	<i>Talk 1</i> Fairness in real-estate division <i>Talk 2</i> TBA
Piotr Skowron <i>University of Warsaw, Poland</i>	A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making
Zhaohong Sun <i>Kyushu University, Japan</i>	Stable Matching in Practice: Daycare Matching Markets in Japan
Hanna Sumita <i>Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan</i>	Fair Allocation with Binary Valuations for Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods via Hybrid Convex Optimization
Biaoshuai Tao <i>Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China</i>	Truthful and Almost Envy-Free Mechanism of Allocating Indivisible Goods: the Power of Randomness
Nicholas Teh <i>University of Oxford, UK</i>	Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
Rohit Vaish <i>Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, India</i>	Fair Interval Scheduling of Indivisible Chores
Adrian Vetta <i>McGill University, Canada</i>	TBA
Xiaowei Wu <i>University of Macau, Macau</i>	Fair Allocation of Chores with Subsidy
Yu Yokoi <i>Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan</i>	Popular Matching under Matroid and Optimality Constraints
Sherman Yuen <i>National University of Singapore, Singapore</i>	Attaining EF1 Allocations by Exchanging Goods

Speaker & Affiliation	Talk Title
William Zwicker <i>Union College, USA</i>	<i>Talk 1</i> Cutsets and EF1 fair division of graphs, continued <i>Talk 2</i> The Median Procedure – a Universal Aggregation Rule?

This list is accurate as of 16 October 2024 and is subjected to changes.