Institute for Mathematical Sciences

Dynamic Models in Economics

(4 - 22 Jun 2018 & 2 Jul - 3 Aug 2018)

Visitor List

Nishant Agrawal
University of Kansas, USA
Georgy Artemov
University of Melbourne, Australia

Strategic 'mistakes': implications for market design research

Pak Hung Au
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Peer effect and the structure of teams

(PDF)

Jinsoo Bae
The Ohio State University, USA

An experimental study of the generalized second price auction

Ian Ball
Yale University, USA

Designing dynamic informational incentives

Juan Carlos Carbajal
University of New South Wales, Australia

Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer

(PDF)

Jimmy Chan
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Self-evident events and the value of linking

(PDF)

Shurojit Chatterji
Singapore Management University, Singapore

Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains

Enxian Chen
National University of Singapore , Singapore
Enxian Chen
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Yanlin Chen
University of Technology Sydney , Australia
Yi-Chun Chen
National University of Singapore, Singapore

Learning by matching

Ying Chen
Johns Hopkins University, USA

When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication

(PDF)

In-Koo Cho
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Youngsub Chun
Seoul National University, Korea

Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

Kim-Sau Chung
Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong

Dinosaur judges: conservative experts in a changing society

Anovia Yifan Dai
Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong

Consumer search and optimal pricing under limited commitment

Ranjan Dissanyake
University of Alaska Fairbanks, USA
Jiayun Dong
Duke University, USA

Default bias in dynamic choices

Darrell Duffie
Stanford University, USA

Distinguished Visitor Lecture Series / NUS Finance Cluster Interdisciplinary Speaker Series:

Redesigning over-the-counter financial markets

Hülya Eraslan
Rice University, USA

Dynamics of environmental policy

(PDF)

Xin Feng
University of International Business and Economics , China

Procurement design with optimal sequential R&D

Marcos Fernandes
Stony Brook University, USA
Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Keio University, Japan

Tolerance and behavioral diversity

Simon Grant
Australian National University, Australia

Ambiguity and the centipede game: Strategic uncertainty in multi-stage games with almost perfect information

(PDF)

Amir Habibi
University College London, UK

Motivation and information design

Peter Hammond
University of Warwick, UK

Lusin’s theorem and mechanism design: lessons from the Vickrey-Mirrlees model of optimal income taxation

(PDF)

Kevin He
Harvard University, USA

Network structure and naive sequential learning

Wei He
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Pure-Strategy equilibria in Bayesian games

(PDF)


Equivalence of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms

(PDF)

Kazuyuki Higashi
The University of Tokyo, Japan

High-frequency trading arms race under national market system: welfare analysis under CLOB and FBA

Johannes Hörner
Yale University, USA and Toulouse School of Economics, France

Keeping your story straight: Truthtelling and liespotting

(PDF)

Gaoji Hu
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

TBA

Taiwei Hu
University of Bristol, UK

Gradual bargaining in decentralized asset markets

(PDF)

Xiaoxiao Hu
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong
Hao-Wen Huang
National Central University, Taiwan
Minyi Huang
Carleton University, Canada

Tutorial:

An Introduction to mean field game theory

(PDF 1) (PDF 2) (Video 1) (Video 2)

Wenjie Huang
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Michihiro Kandori
The University of Tokyo, Japan
M. Ali Khan
Johns Hopkins University, USA

On Hurwicz-Nash equilibria of Non-Bayesian games under incomplete information

(PDF)

Jinwoo Kim
Seoul National University, Korea

Prestige concerns in college admissions

Fuhito Kojima
Stanford University, USA

Public Lecture:

Introduction to Market Design


Tutorial:

Matching theory and market design: theory and applications

Hideo Konishi
Boston College, USA

Incentivizing team production by indivisible prizes: Electoral competition under proportional representation

(PDF)

Vijay Krishna
Pennsylvania State University, USA
Kah Wah Lai
DSO National Laboratories, Singapore
Wing Tung Lam
Yale-NUS College, Singapore
Ying Sheng Lam
Singapore University of Technology Design, Singapore
Giacomo Lanzani
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA

Learning and self-confirming long-run biases

Daniil Larionov
University of Mannheim, Germany
Tina Letsou
Boston College, USA
Tsz Kin Leung
Toulouse School of Economics, France

Limited cognitive ability and selective information processing

Jiangtao Li
University of New South Wales, Australia

Strategically simple mechanisms

(PDF)

Xiaoxi Li
Wuhan University, China
Yunan Li
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

(PDF)

Jaimie Lien
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Wee Chuan Eldin Lim
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Bin Liu
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China

Sequential screening with hidden actions

Chunchun Liu
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Heng Liu
University of Michigan, USA

Collusion-proof dynamic mechanisms

(PDF)

Peng Liu
Singapore Management University, Singapore
Jingfeng Lu
National University of Singapore, Singapore

Optimal selling mechanism with buyer price search

Xiao Luo
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Komal Malik
Indian Statistical Institute, India
Akihiko Matsui
University of Tokyo, Japan

A two-stage model of assignment and market

Yuri Matsumura
The University of Tokyo, Japan
Hitoshi Matsushima
University of Tokyo, Japan

Framing game theory

(PDF)

Richard McLean
Rutgers University, USA

Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

(PDF)

Andy Mclennan
University of Queensland, Australia

Efficient disposal equilibria of pseudomarkets

(PDF)

Margaret Meyer
Oxford University, UK

The supermodular ordering of dependence: theory and applications

Claudio Mezzetti
The University of Queensland, Australia

What do mediators do? Information and bargaining design

(PDF)

Sergei Mikhalishchev
Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Czech Republic
Thi Mai Anh Nguyen
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
Alexandru Nichifor
University of Melbourne, Australia

Chain stability in trading networks

Jonathon Ooi
Australian International School, Singapore
Franz Peter Ostrizek
Princeton University, USA

Screening with frames

Mallesh Pai
Rice University, USA

Compromising quality to stay relevant

(PDF)

Ting Pei
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Parkpoom Phetpradap
Chiang Mai University, Thailand
Kym Pram
European University Institute, Italy

Learning and evidence in principal-agent environments

(PDF)

Lei Qiao
Shanghai University of Economics and Finance, China

Continuous time random matching

Ravi Kant Rai
Indian Institute of Technology, India
Kali Rath
University of Notre Dame, USA

Modeling infinitely many agents: Why countable additivity is necessary

(PDF)

Philip J. Reny
The University of Chicago, USA

Distinguished Visitor Lecture Series:

Perfect conditional epsilon-equilibria of multi-stage games with infinite sets of signals and actions

(PDF)


Distinguished Visitor Lecture Series:

How to count citations if you must

(PDF)

Ariel Rubinstein
Tel Aviv University, Israel and New York University, USA
Matthew Ryan
Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand
Yuliy Sannikov
Stanford University, USA

Distinguished Visitor Lecture Series / NUS Finance Cluster Interdisciplinary Speaker Series:

Dynamic contracts

(PDF)


Department of Economics Seminar Series / NUS Finance Cluster Interdisciplinary Speaker Series:

Dynamic trading: price inertia and front-running

Jan Sedek
Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Czech Republic
Arshay Sheth
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Xianwen Shi
University of Toronto , Canada

Optimal discriminatory disclosure

(PDF)

Eran Shmaya
Northwestern University, USA

Costly miscalibration

(PDF)

Marciano Siniscalchi
Northwestern University, USA

Structural rationality in dynamic games

(PDF)

Ran Spiegler
Tel Aviv University, Israel and University College London, UK

Behavioral implications of causal misperceptions

Egor Starkov
Northwestern University, USA

Bad news turned good: reversal under censorship

Maxwell B Stinchcombe
The University of Texas at Austin, USA

Mislaid pieces in finitely additive population games

(PDF)

Bruno Strulovici
Northwestern University, USA

Judicial mechanism design

(PDF)

Wing Suen
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Optimal delay in committees

(PDF)

Ning Sun
Nanjing Audit University, China

Matching and rematching with commitment

Xiang Sun
Wuhan University, China

Perfect equilibria in large games

(PDF)

Yeneng Sun
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Yifei Sun
University of International Business and Economics, China

Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima

(PDF)

Yufeng Sun
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Shy voter effect in committee decisions

Satoru Takahashi
National University of Singapore, Singapore

Non-equivalence between all and canonical elaborations

(PDF)

Teck Yong Tan
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Qianfeng Tang
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China

On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

Rui Tang
Princeton University, USA

Coarse revealed preference

Tat How Teh
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Olivier Tercieux
Paris School of Economics, France

Minimizing justified envy in school choice and top trading cycle

Rabee Tourky
Australia National University, Australia

The very odd lattice of cumulative distributions

(PDF)

Peter Troyan
University of Virginia, USA

Obvious dominance and random piority

(PDF)

Min-Hung Tsay
National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan
Rakesh Vohra
University of Pennsylvania, USA

Tutorial:

The reduced form in mechanism design

(PDF 1, PDF 2)

Allen Vong
Yale University, USA

Optimal rating system

Junjie Wang
Harbin Institute of Technology, China
Zijia Wang
National University of Singapore, Singapore

Optimal selling mechanism with buyer price search

Dong Wei
University of California, Berkeley, USA

Attention management

Xi Weng
Peking University, China

Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Bin Wu
National University of Singapore , Singapore
Wenhao Wu
University of Arizona, USA

Sequential Bayesian persuasion

Jingyi Xue
Singapore Management University, Singapore

Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain demands

(PDF)

Xiangqian Yang
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Chun-Hsien Yeh
Academia Sinica, Taiwan

A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on the concede-and-divide algorithm in bankruptcy problems

(PDF)

Won Seok Yoo
New York University, USA
Haomiao Yu
Ryerson University, Canada

The weak α-core of large games

(PDF)

Cuiling Zhang
Singapore Management University, Singapore
Shengxing Zhang
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Dynamic liquidity-based security design

Yongchao Zhang
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China

Weak stability and pareto efficiency in school choice

Zhixiang Zhang
Central University of Finance and Economics, China
Lin Zhao
Hong Kong University of Technology and Science, Hong Kong
Jie Zheng
Tsinghua Universtiy, China

Multi-period matching with commitment

Songfa Zhong
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Hang Zhou
University of California, Davis, USA

Essay on the level-k thinking and the convergence to a rational expectation equilibrium

Junjie Zhou
National University of Singapore, Singapore

Coordination on networks

(PDF)